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Abstract—A huge amount of personal and sensitive data is
shared on Facebook, which makes it a prime target for attackers.
Adversaries can exploit third-party applications connected to a
user’s Facebook profile (i.e., Facebook apps) to gain access to this
personal information. Users’ lack of knowledge and the varying
privacy policies of these apps make them further vulnerable to
information leakage. However, little has been done to identify
mismatches between users’ perceptions and the privacy policies
of Facebook apps. We address this challenge in our work. We
conducted a lab study with 31 participants, where we received
data on how they share information in Facebook, their Facebook-
related security and privacy practices, and their perceptions
on the privacy aspects of 65 frequently-used Facebook apps
in terms of data collection, sharing, and deletion. We then
compared participants’ perceptions with the privacy policy of
each reported app. Participants also reported their expectations
about the types of information that should not be collected or
shared by any Facebook app. Our analysis reveals significant
mismatches between users’ privacy perceptions and reality (i.e.,
privacy policies of Facebook apps), where we identified over-
optimism not only in users’ perceptions of information collection,
but also on their self-efficacy in protecting their information in
Facebook despite experiencing negative incidents in the past. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on the gap
between users’ privacy perceptions around Facebook apps and
the reality. The findings from this study offer directions for future
research to address that gap through designing usable, effective,
and personalized privacy notices to help users to make informed
decisions about using Facebook apps.
Index Terms—Privacy; Perceptions; Facebook; Third-party
Applications; User Study
I. INTRODUCTION
Social networks like Facebook have become an integral part
of everyday life for many people, as they are used to maintain
social ties, build professional connections, share news and
interests, and promote business. Also, a wide variety of third-
party applications use Facebook’s social login feature that
allows users to log into those applications from their Facebook
profile (we call these Facebook apps or just apps in this paper).
People share a plethora of information through their Facebook
profile, which makes it a prime target for attackers to gain ac-
cess to users’ sensitive and personal information [27, 44, 55].
Adversaries may also exploit Facebook apps to collect users’
information from their Facebook account. The Cambridge
Analytica scandal [7, 25]in particular exposed the vulnerability
of users’ personal information to these third parties.
A. Motivation
After the Cambridge Analytica incident [7, 25], the pri-
vacy risks of third-party apps connected to users’ Facebook
accounts have drawn widespread attention. However, users
lack knowledge of how to keep the security and privacy of
their social network profile [3, 27, 49]. This challenge can
be exacerbated by the varying privacy policies of Facebook
apps in terms of data collection and sharing. Prior work has
shed light on users’ understanding of general privacy settings
on the Facebook website [26, 38, 54, 56]. However, users’
perceptions and expectations about data collection, sharing,
and deletion through Facebook apps are still understudied.
Prior work on mismatches between privacy policies and user
expectations in platforms other than Facebook [4, 13, 43],
while partially helpful in this regard, also illustrates that these
policies vary across platforms.
With the ubiquitous use of social login to third-party apps,
it is important to understand users’ information sharing, their
security and privacy practices, and the mismatch between
users’ perceptions and the privacy policies of Facebook apps
in order to effectively devise usable solutions to help users
make more informed privacy decisions for third-party apps.
We address these challenges in this paper. In particular,
we conducted a lab study, where participants reported their
information sharing through Facebook, security and privacy
practices in Facebook to protect their information, frequently
used Facebook apps, and their perceptions of each of those
apps’ privacy policies in terms of data collection, sharing, and
deletion (i.e., the right to be forgotten), and their expectations
of information that should not be collected or shared by any
Facebook app.
B. Contributions
In this study, we received data on a total of 113 apps (65
unique apps) from 31 participants. We then investigated the
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privacy policy of each reported app and compared it with the
privacy perceptions of the participants. Our analysis reveals
significant mismatches between users’ privacy perceptions and
reality (i.e., the actual privacy policies of the apps). Overall, we
identified a 40% mismatch between perceptions and policies
on information collection, where 80% of these mismatches are
overly optimistic: participants believe that the information is
not collected by an app, even though it actually is collected
according to the app’s privacy policy.
We identified similar over-optimism in participants’ re-
sponses on their ability (self-efficacy) to protect their infor-
mation in Facebook. Despite experiencing negative incidents
in the past, including account compromise and leakage of
personal information, users do not take adequate security and
privacy protection steps in Facebook. Our results also indicate
how users’ information sharing behavior in Facebook could
pose risks for their overall online security and privacy.
As participants reported their expectations for privacy from
Facebook apps, we found that they expect apps to share
less information than they collect. Based on our findings, we
recommend providing users with tools and information that
they need to make informed decisions in using Facebook apps.
We provide directions for apps to better address users’ privacy
expectations, where our findings provide important insights
to design usable and effective privacy notices by highlighting
unexpected data practices. Our study also shows the impor-
tance of taking users’ demographic traits into account in the
design of personalized privacy notices, where we identified
differences in mismatched privacy perceptions across gender
and age.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss recent incidents of information
leakage in Facebook, users’ understanding of Facebook pri-
vacy settings, and mismatches between users’ expectations and
online privacy policies, including Facebook. We then briefly
discuss social login, which is used by the third-party apps
connected to users’ Facebook accounts.
A. Information Leakage through Facebook
With the progress of technology and the development of
new business models, the security and privacy issues become
more complex, creating major concerns for users [37].
The privacy issues with Facebook stem from the abundance
of data that its users share through the platform [16]. A bug
in the Facebook interface exposed the private information of
around six million users in 2013 [14]. In 2014, Facebook
conducted an experiment regarding mood manipulation via
the newsfeed of randomly selected users [35], which raised
unrest among users about how Facebook was handling their
data. Then in 2015, Facebook had to shut down an API
that allowed applications to access users’ private information,
especially the information about users’ friends [8]. As the
Cambridge Analytica scandal broke in 2018 [24], the news
came to light that the personal information of about 87 million
Facebook users were harvested and used through the third-
party app without the users’ consent. While this news sparked
a worldwide discussion about users’ data privacy in Facebook,
all these noted incidents in recent years kept raising the
question of how much control the users have on their personal
and sensitive information shared through social networking
sites and Facebook in particular.
B. Privacy Policy and Settings
Privacy notices often fail to help users with making an
informed privacy decision due to their excessive length, com-
plicated language, or poor visualization [28, 41]. As a result,
users pay little attention to the privacy policy, and give consent
to use the application, website, or an IoT (Internet-of-Things)
device without a proper understanding of its data collection
and sharing practices [13, 39, 48].
As recommended in prior studies [41, 48], a privacy no-
tice should aim for simplicity, brevity, and clarity in design
for being understandable to general users. Knijnenburg and
Cherry [34] proposed a comic-based approach to make privacy
policies more understandable and fun to read. The studies of
Kelly et al. [30, 31]evaluated the usability and efficacy of a
privacy “nutrition label,” where the authors designed a tabular
format to enhance user’s understanding of privacy practices,
increase the speed of finding privacy related information, and
facilitate comparison between the privacy policies of different
websites and applications.
Sathyendra et al. [47] examined the problem of automatic
identification of privacy choices in a privacy policy. They
focused on opt-out choices offered in a privacy policy, and
leveraged machine-learning techniques to automatically extract
relevant information from the privacy policy of a website [47].
Sadeh et al. [46] employed crowdsourcing on top of machine-
learning and natural language processing to develop a scalable
infrastructure that semi-automatically provides answers to the
privacy related questions that a user may have. Anton et al. [4]
leveraged the privacy policy of different healthcare providers
to present a taxonomy for classifying privacy goals, where they
also described the use of goal-mining to examine the privacy
policy for system requirements.
In our work, we focused on the third-party applications
that are connected to users’ Facebook accounts. Within this
domain,
Torres et al. [54] found that over 25% of participants in
their study were unsure of their Facebook privacy settings,
and about 20% of participants did not change their privacy
settings at all, indicating that it did not seem necessary. In
contrast, Jabee et al. [26] found that users resorted to the
default Facebook privacy settings due to not understanding
how to find and change them. Tuunainen et al. [56] reported
that over half of the participants in their study were unaware
of how the information from their Facebook profile was shared
with other entities, despite stating that they went through the
general Facebook privacy settings. Boyd et al. [6] focused
on the privacy practices of young adults in Facebook, where
they found a general interest among participants to adjust the
privacy settings of their account. In a separate study [38], 85%
of participants stated that Facebook’s privacy settings should
be improved.
These studies only consider the general Facebook privacy
settings and did not shed light on the privacy features of third-
party apps connected to users’ Facebook accounts.
C. Mismatches in Privacy Expectations
Rao et al. [43] examined mismatches between users’ ex-
pectations and the privacy policies of general websites, like
the financial and health sites. The study [43] revealed that the
mismatch between users’ privacy expectations and the actual
privacy policy of a website could be over 50% for certain types
of information. Liu et. at [38] examined the disparity between
users’ expectations and their Facebook privacy settings. In this
study, authors found that the privacy expectations of users did
not match with their privacy setting in 37% of cases. Neither
of these studies, however, focused on the mismatch between
users’ perceptions and the privacy policies of third-party apps
connected to their Facebook account.
D. Social Login
Social login [45] is a mechanism that uses existing infor-
mation to identity a user on a social networking platform
to register or log into a third-party app or website. The
convenience in account creation and authentication via social
login has elevated its popularity among users [52]. However,
social login may provide third-party websites and apps with
permissions to obtain users’ personal information from their
social network profile. Accordingly, Egelman [12] found that
15% of participants chose not to use the social login service
due to privacy concerns, where 88% of participants reported
understanding the access privileges they allow to a website
through social login.
In this paper, we focus on the third-party apps connected to
users’ Facebook accounts through social login. In particular,
we study users’ perceptions on the type of information col-
lected and shared by these apps and users’ ability to have their
collected information deleted. We then identify the mismatch
between users’ perceptions and the privacy policies of these
apps.
III. METHODOLOGY
We conducted the study in a lab environment, between
August 2018 and January 2019, where participants completed
the survey hosted on the Qualtrics platform after they had read
and agreed to informed consent document. We preferred a lab
setting for this study to make sure participants go through
their Facebook account in order to carefully review the apps
connected to their account before they report them in the
study. Participants were given the option to use either their
own laptop or the lab computer to log into their Facebook
account and complete the survey. When participants used the
lab computer, we ensured that they used an incognito browser
tab and logged out of their Facebook account by the end of
study session. The sessions lasted for around 35 minutes on
average. Student participants each received a $10 Amazon
gift card for taking part in the study, though we could not
compensate the university staff members due to university
rules. The study was approved by the university’s Institutional
Review Board.
For each reported app, we asked participants about their
privacy perceptions in terms of information collected and
shared by that app, and the deletion options it offers to users.
Later, we conducted a detailed review of the privacy policy
of each app reported by the participants and compared that
with their privacy perceptions. Here, we analyzed the privacy
policies that were in effect as of April 2019, which was after
the Cambridge Analytica incident [7, 25] and the publishing
of new privacy policy by Facebook in May, 2018 [50]. Our
analysis revealed the mismatches in the privacy perceptions of
users and their choices of apps.
A. Data Collection
For each reported app, participants were asked about their
perceptions of its privacy policy in terms of: information
collected from users, information shared with other entities
to provide users with intended services or for other purposes,
and the options offered to users to delete the information
collected from them. After participants reported their privacy
perceptions for each of the reported apps, they were asked
about their overall privacy expectations, such as the types of
information they believe should not be collected and shared
by any app connected to their Facebook account.
In addition to the questions on privacy perceptions and
expectations, we asked participants about their demograph-
ics (e.g., gender, birth year, race), education and current
occupation, training in fields related to computer science,
general Facebook usage (e.g., how long they have been using
Facebook, how many friends they have, how many groups they
are member of, and how often they access Facebook), type of
information they share through their Facebook profile, steps
they take for security and privacy-preserving use of Facebook,
their self-efficacy in protecting the security and privacy of
their Facebook account, and any negative experiences they had
faced in the past with regard to using Facebook and performing
online activities.
B. Facebook Applications
Participants were asked to report all of their apps up to
a maximum of five, where participants with more than five
apps were asked to report the five apps used most frequently.
We categorize the reported apps (see below) based on the
guidelines from prior research [20, 21].
• Financial. This category includes apps that involve finan-
cial transactions. We divide these apps into two subcate-
gories: i) Primary financial app, where making financial
transactions is the primary purpose of the app, as in online
banking, and ii) Secondary financial app, where financial
transactions are not the primary purpose of the app but
are certainly required, as in e-commerce.
• Identity. An app that needs users to provide their identity,
health, or other personal information to use its primary
services is included to Identity category. We divide these
apps into four subcategories: i) Communication: apps
that facilitate conversation through chat, voice, or video
call, ii) Fitness: apps that assist in fitness and health
tracking, iii) Q&A: apps that allow the users to get
answers on certain topics from other users, and iv) Social
Networking: apps that create a platform for users to
socialize in an online setting.
• Content. The apps in this category provide users with
content related to entertainment, news, and different types
of listing (e.g., jobs, apartments, etc). Users do not need to
make any financial transactions or provide their personal
information to use these apps.
• Other. Apps in the game and utility subcategories com-
prise most of the Other category.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we present the findings from our user study
and report the results of our statistical tests where we found
a significant difference (p-value is less than 0.05).
A. Participants
A total of 31 participants took part in our study (Female:
15; Male: 15; Did not disclose gender: one participant).
Twenty of our participants were students, and the remaining 11
participants were university staff members. The average age of
our participants was 29 (minimum: 19; maximum: 63), where
the average age of the participants in the staff and student pools
were 40 and 23, respectively. Seventeen of our participants
identified as White, followed by 12 Asian/Pacific Islanders,
one Black/African American, and one multiracial. All of our
participants had at least a Bachelor’s degree or were currently
working toward it. Fourteen participants are pursuing or have
completed a degree in computer science or a related field.
B. Facebook Usage
All of the participants are regular users of social networking
sites like Facebook. On average, they have been using Face-
book for around nine years (students: eight years, staff: eleven
Category Sub-Category App Count Total Mentions










Other Game 9 11Utility 6 9
TABLE I: Number of Unique Facebook Apps and Total
Number of Mentions Reported by the Participants
years), currently have around 500 friends, and are members
of about 25 groups. Each participant had on average 10 apps
connected to their Facebook account. Participants in the staff
pool reported visiting their Facebook account more often as
compared to the student population.
1) Sharing Personal Information.: Over two-thirds of the
participants reported that they do not share their mobile
number, email ID, or current physical address through their
Facebook profile, neither publicly nor with their friend list,
where over one-third of participants do not share informa-
tion about their current relationship status, religious views,
or political views. On the other hand, at least half of the
participants share their full name and gender publicly through
their profile, and at least one-third of our participants publicly
share the information about their educational institutions (e.g.,
high school, college), current workplace, and current city. This
means that anyone could gain access to this information by
crawling their Facebook profile. We found instances where
participants do not share their physical address with their
friend list but do share the more general information publicly,
like the city they currently live in (see Table IX in the
Appendix for further details).
In response to the question on sharing their current location
in Facebook (e.g., through ‘check-in’ posts), 21 participants
(67.7%) reported that they never share their current location
publicly, i.e., with someone who is not in their friend list, while
14 participants (45%) do not share their current location even
with their Facebook friends.
2) Security and Privacy Protection: We asked participants
about the steps they take for secure browsing, checking their
Facebook security and privacy settings, and confirming the
identity of unknown persons before adding them to their friend
list. Participants also reported their self-efficacy in maintaining
the security and privacy of their Facebook account.
a) Secure Browsing.: Checking for a secure connec-















Financial Primary 0 0 4 2 0Secondary 1 0 1 11 3
Identity/Personal
Communication 1 1 1 3 0
Fitness 0 0 0 3 1
Q&A 0 2 3 2 1
Social Networking 7 5 2 6 2
Content
Entertainment 9 6 2 14 0
Listing 1 0 7 7 1
News 2 0 0 1 0
Other Game 5 1 0 5 1Utility 2 0 1 6 0
TABLE II: Users’ Concerns about Facebook Apps

















































Primary 3 1 4 1 3 0 1 4 0 1 0 0
Secondary 6 5 10 1 10 1 5 1 1 5 0 1
SUBTOTAL 9 6 14 2 13 1 6 5 1 6 0 1
% 42.9% 28.6% 66.7% 9.5% 61.9% 4.8% 28.6% 23.8% 4.8% 28.6% 0.0% 4.8%
Identity/Personal
Communication 0 0 3 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 1 0
Health 0 2 4 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Q/A 4 2 4 0 2 0 1 1 2 3 1 0
Social Networking 7 7 13 4 14 8 8 5 4 4 1 0
SUBTOTAL 11 11 24 6 21 10 10 7 7 9 3 1
% 35.5% 35.5% 77.4% 19.4% 67.7% 32.3% 32.3% 22.6% 22.6% 29.0% 9.7% 3.2%
Content
Entertainment 2 5 11 5 14 4 6 8 3 7 1 4
Listing 4 4 14 1 12 2 7 1 2 5 1 1
News 3 3 3 1 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 0
SUBTOTAL 9 12 28 7 29 6 15 9 5 13 2 5
% 22.0% 29.3% 68.3% 17.1% 70.7% 14.6% 36.6% 22.0% 12.2% 31.7% 4.9% 12.2%
Other
Game 1 1 9 0 5 3 0 3 2 4 0 1
Utility 1 0 7 2 5 2 5 2 1 0 0 1
SUBTOTAL 2 1 16 2 10 5 5 5 3 4 0 2
% 10.0% 5.0% 80.0% 10.0% 50.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 15.0% 20.0% 0.0% 10.0%
TOTAL 31 30 82 17 73 22 36 26 16 32 5 9
% 27.4% 26.5% 72.6% 15.0% 64.6% 19.5% 31.9% 23.0% 14.2% 28.3% 4.4% 8.0%
TABLE III: Users’ Perceptions of Information Collected by Facebook Apps
while clicking on a link are recommended security prac-
tices to protect against cyber attacks, including phishing and
malware [3, 10, 36]. In our study, about one-fifth of the
participants reported that they always check for a secure
connection (e.g., ‘https’, padlock icon in URL bar) when
visiting Facebook. About one-fourth of our participants noted
that they always hover over a Facebook link before clicking
on it to be sure of the destination site.
b) Checking Security and Privacy Settings.: All of our
participants except two reported checking the security and pri-
vacy settings of their Facebook account, where 14 participants
(45.2%; students: seven out of 20, staff: seven out of 11)
check that setting whenever they find out about a security
or privacy breach in someone else’s account, either through
news or personal communication. Fifteen of our participants
(48.4%; students: 11 out of 20, staff: four out of 11) check
their security and privacy settings when they are informed of
any new changes in Facebook’s security and privacy features.
Students (55%) are more likely than the staff participants
(36%) to check their security and privacy settings when they
come to know about any new changes in Facebook’s security
and privacy features. On the other hand, as compared to
the student population (35%), staff members (64%) are more
likely to check their security and privacy setting when they
get to know about a security or privacy incident.
c) Adding Unknown Friends.: When accepting a friend
request from an unknown person in Facebook, 14 of 21 stu-
dents (70%) and seven of 11 staff members (63.6%) reported
that they do not usually take any steps to verify the identity
of that person, which could create risks of compromise by
adversaries posing as friends.
d) Self Efficacy.: The participants reported above-average
self-efficacy (higher than 3.5 on a 7-point Likert scale) on
all aspects related to maintaining the security and privacy
of their Facebook account. Overall, students reported higher
self-efficacy than the staff participants in all aspects except
for having no fake people in their Facebook friend list (see
Table X in Appendix).
3) Negative Experiences: Six of our student participants
reported that their Facebook account had been hacked by ad-
versaries in the past, where 27 participants (87.1%) had heard
of at least one incident in which the Facebook account of their
friend or family member was compromised. Upon hearing
about such incidents, 18 (58.1%) of our participants changed
their Facebook password, 10 (32.3%) participants turned on
two-factor authentication for their Facebook account, and five
participants (16%) reviewed their friend list to identify any
fake or suspicious entities. Several participants reported taking
more than one of the above steps to protect their account from
unauthorized access, but four participants (12.9%) reported not
taking any step at all.
In addition to Facebook account compromise, participants
reported having faced other negative experiences through
social networking sites and online activities, including stalking
and harassment (students: 5, staff: 4), damage of reputation
(students: 5), difficulties in personal relationships due to

















































Primary 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0
Secondary 0 1 7 0 2 1 3 2 0 2 0 0
SUBTOTAL 0 1 12 0 2 1 5 5 0 2 0 0
% 0.0% 4.8% 57.1% 0.0% 9.5% 4.8% 23.8% 23.8% 0.0% 9.5% 0.0% 0.0%
Identity/Personal
Communication 0 0 4 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Health 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Q/A 2 1 3 0 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
Social Networking 2 1 10 0 9 4 5 1 1 1 0 1
SUBTOTAL 5 2 19 0 16 6 7 1 2 3 0 1
% 16.1% 6.5% 61.3% 0.0% 51.6% 19.4% 22.6% 3.2% 6.5% 9.7% 0.0% 3.2%
Content
Entertainment 0 4 9 2 9 1 9 2 1 8 0 3
Listing 2 2 8 0 8 1 7 1 1 4 0 0
News 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
SUBTOTAL 2 6 17 2 17 2 16 3 2 13 0 3
% 4.9% 14.6% 41.5% 4.9% 41.5% 4.9% 39.0% 7.3% 4.9% 31.7% 0.0% 7.3%
Other
Game 1 0 4 1 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 0
Utility 0 0 5 1 4 1 3 1 0 0 0 0
SUBTOTAL 1 0 9 2 6 2 3 2 1 2 0 0
% 5.0% 0.0% 45.0% 10.0% 30.0% 10.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0%
TOTAL 8 9 57 4 41 11 31 11 5 20 0 4
% 7.1% 8.0% 50.4% 3.5% 36.3% 9.7% 27.4% 9.7% 4.4% 17.7% 0.0% 3.5%
TABLE IV: Users’ Perceptions of Information Shared by Facebook Apps with Other Entities (to Provide Service)
social networking posts (students: 10, staff: 3), leakage of
personal information to unwanted entities (students: 3, staff:
7), and being a victim of online scams incurring monetary loss
(students: 4, staff: 1). Among students, it was common to face
difficulties in personal relationships due to social networking
posts, where half of them reported having this experience. For
staff, leakage of personal information by unwanted entities was
a notable concern, where two-third of them reported being a
victim of such an incident.
C. Facebook apps
As we asked participants to report the apps connected to
their Facebook account, we received a total of 113 entries as
listed in Table I. After removing the duplicate apps, we got
65 unique apps. Participants reported to learn about most of
the apps from their friends, either through online invitations
or offline conversations. They also learn about Facebook apps
through ads. The majority of reported apps are used by our
participants at least once a week, and about one-third of the
apps are used daily.
a) Users’ Concerns and Past Removal of apps.: The
participants reported “Waste of Time” and “Privacy” to be their
primary concerns about the apps connected to their Facebook
account (see Table II). They mentioned removing a total of
23 apps in the past, where most of them were games or
entertainment apps. They removed those apps as they were
no longer needed, or they were too time consuming. They did
not mention about removing any app due to privacy concerns.
D. Privacy Perceptions of Users
In this section, we present our findings on the perceptions
of users about the types of information collected and shared
by their third-party Facebook apps, and their ability to have
their collected information deleted.
1) Information Collection.: As perceived by our partici-
pants, identity apps collect the most information from users,
followed by content, financial, and finally other apps (e.g.,
game, utility). According to them, the contact and basic
information of users are collected by 73% of all apps, fol-
lowed by users’ details like name and favorites (65%), their
current location (32%), and information about users’ work
and education (27%). Below, we discuss our findings on
users’ perceptions of information collection across different
app categories (see Table III for further details).
a) Financial.: According to our participants, around two-
thirds of financial apps to collect users’ details (e.g., name,
favorites), contact and basic information, and over one-third
of financial apps collect information about users’ work and
education. In contrast, no financial app is believed to collect
users’ inbox messages, while posts on their newsfeed, and
users’ photos and videos are collected by fewer than 5% of
financial apps in their view.
b) Identity.: Our participants believe that over three-
fourths of identity apps collect users’ contact and basic infor-
mation, two-thirds collect their details (e.g., name, favorites),
and around one-third collect users’ photos and videos, infor-
mation about their work and education, places they have lived,

















































Primary 4 3 0 4 5 4 2 1 3 4 3 0
Secondary 5 5 3 6 3 6 5 4 5 6 4 0
SUBTOTAL 9 8 3 10 8 10 7 5 8 10 7 0
% 42.9% 38.1% 14.3% 47.6% 38.1% 47.6% 33.3% 23.8% 38.1% 47.6% 33.3% 0.0%
Identity/Personal
Communication 1 2 0 1 3 0 2 1 2 3 1 0
Health 1 2 2 2 4 1 0 1 2 1 1 0
Q/A (Quora) 3 3 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 0 0
Social Networking 6 6 5 7 5 4 6 5 6 9 8 0
SUBTOTAL 11 13 8 11 15 6 10 8 11 14 10 0
% 35.5% 41.9% 25.8% 35.5% 48.4% 19.4% 32.3% 25.8% 35.5% 45.2% 32.3% 0.0%
Content
Entertainment 9 6 8 8 9 6 5 7 5 6 7 0
Listing 6 5 7 6 8 6 4 4 7 5 4 0
News 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 0
SUBTOTAL 17 13 17 16 20 13 10 12 14 12 12 0
% 41.5% 31.7% 41.5% 39.0% 48.8% 31.7% 24.4% 29.3% 34.1% 29.3% 29.3% 0.0%
Other
Game 2 3 4 4 4 5 2 3 3 5 1 0
Utility 3 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 2 4 3 1
SUBTOTAL 5 6 5 7 5 6 3 6 5 9 4 1
% 25.0% 30.0% 25.0% 35.0% 25.0% 30.0% 15.0% 30.0% 25.0% 45.0% 20.0% 5.0%
TOTAL 42 40 33 44 48 35 30 31 38 45 33 1
% 37.2% 35.4% 29.2% 38.9% 42.5% 31.0% 26.5% 27.4% 33.6% 39.8% 29.2% 0.9%
TABLE V: Users’ Perceptions of Information Shared by Facebook Apps with Other Entities (Not Required to Provide Service)
and current location. About 10% of identity apps are believed
to view users’ inbox messages.
c) Content.: More than two-thirds of content apps are
believed to collect users’ details (e.g., name, favorites), contact
and basic information, while around one-third collect current
location and online presence. Fewer than 5% of content apps
collect users’ inbox messages.
d) Other.: Over three-fourths of apps in the ’other’
category (e.g., game, utility) are believed to collect users’
contact and basic information, and half of the apps collect
users’ details (e.g., name, favorites). On the other hand, none
of the apps in ‘other’ category collect users’ inbox messages,
and fewer than 10% of ‘other’ apps collect information about
the places users have lived in our participants’ view.
2) Information Sharing.: As we asked participants about
their perceptions on the information that apps share with
other entities as necessary to provide them with intended
service, and they reported that 50.4% of apps (financial:
57.1%, identity: 61.3%, content: 41.5%, and other: 45.0%)
share their contact and basic information with other entities.
According to the participants’ perceptions, their details (e.g.,
name, favorites) and information about their current location
are shared by 36.9%, and 27.4% of apps, respectively (see
Table IV).
The participants also reported their perceptions on the
information that they think the apps share with other entities
although such sharing is not needed to provide them with
intended service (see Table V. In this regard, participants
think that above one-third of apps share at least one of the
following information with other entities: users’ details (name,
favorites), information about their family and relationship,
online presence, their work and education, places they have
lived, and posts on their Facebook newsfeed. As perceived by
the participants, 31% of apps share their photos and videos
with other entities, although they do not need to share such
personal information to provide the intended service.
3) Information Deletion.: For 77% of apps, users think
that they would be allowed to delete the information that
is collected by these apps (see Table VI). In particular, they
reported expecting that all six apps in the ’financial: primary’
category would allow them to delete the collected information.
E. Mismatched Privacy Perceptions
For each app, we compared participants’ privacy perceptions
with the app’s privacy policy. We could not compare users’
perceptions of information sharing with the privacy policy,
since sufficient details about information sharing are not stated
in the apps’ privacy policies.
1) Information Collection.: There are four cases resulting
from our comparison between users’ perceptions and an app’s
privacy policy in terms of data collection by the apps:
• ‘YY’ match: the user believes that the information is
collected by an app and the privacy policy states that
it is indeed collected;
Category Sub-Category Deletion Preference


























TABLE VI: Users’ Perceptions of Deletion Preference Offered
by Facebook Apps
• ‘NN’ match: the user believes that the information is not
collected by an app and the privacy policy of that app
does not indicate such data is collected;
• ‘YN’ mismatch: the user thinks that the information is
collected by an app, but that information is not collected
according to the app’s privacy policy; and
• ‘NY’ mismatch: the user thinks that the information is
not collected by an app, but that information is collected
according to the app’s privacy policy.
Overall, we found an approximately 40% mismatch rate
between users’ perceptions and reality, as we compared partic-
ipants’ perceptions of information collection with the privacy
policy of each reported app. Here, we found most mismatches
for Communication apps (51.7%), followed by Q&A (44.4%)
Category Sub-Category MATCH MISMATCH
YY NN % YN NY %
Financial
Primary 14 32 63.9% 4 22 36.1%
Secondary 32 77 60.6% 15 56 39.4%
SUBTOTAL 46 109 61.5% 19 78 38.5%
Identity/Personal
Communication 10 19 48.3% 1 30 51.7%
Fitness 8 21 60.4% 5 14 39.6%
Q&A 12 28 55.6% 14 18 44.4%
Social Networking 61 64 65.1% 11 56 34.9%
SUBTOTAL 91 132 59.9% 31 118 40.1%
Content
Entertainment 47 114 58.3% 18 97 41.7%
Listing 44 64 60.0% 10 62 40.0%
News 8 15 63.9% 8 5 36.1%
SUBTOTAL 99 193 59.3% 36 164 40.7%
Other
Game 20 63 62.9% 11 38 37.1%
Utility 18 53 65.7% 13 24 34.3%
SUBTOTAL 38 116 64.2% 24 62 35.8%
TOTAL 274 550 60.8% 110 422 39.2%
TABLE VII: Information Collected by Facebook Apps: Users’
Perceptions Compared to Privacy Policy
and Entertainment (41.7%) apps (see Table VII). We found
a significantly higher rate of ‘NY’ mismatches (79.3%) as
compared to ‘YN’ mismatches (20.7%), X 2 = 7.49, p < 0.05.
There was little difference in both the overall mismatch rate
and proportion of ’NY’ versus ’YN’ mismatches among the
four categories of apps.
Our analysis reveals the mismatch between users’ percep-
tions and apps’ privacy policy for different types of infor-
mation, where we found most mismatches for the following
types of information: online presence of users (61.1%), places
where users have lived (58.4%), users’ family and relation-
ship (50.4%), information about users’ friends in Facebook
(51.3%), and the current location of users (44.2%). Among
these types of mismatches, we identified a ‘NY’ mismatch in
89.6% cases (see Table XI- XIV in the Appendix).
While there was not a notable difference between male
and female participants in the overall rate of mismatches, we
identified a significantly higher ‘NY’ mismatch for female
participants (84.6%) as compared to male participants (74.4%),
X 2 = 9.2526, p < 0.05.
2) Information Deletion.: As with, information collection,
there are four cases for information deletion:
• ‘YY’ match: the user believes that she can have her
information deleted, and the app’s privacy policy states
that it can indeed be deleted;
• ‘NN’ match: the user believes that the app will not delete
her information, and the app’s privacy policy indeed does
not indicate that her information can be deleted;
• ‘YN’ mismatch: the user thinks that she can have the app
delete her information, but the app’s privacy policy does
not indicate that it will heed her request; and
• ‘NY’ mismatch: the user believes that the app will not
delete her information, but the app’s privacy policy
actually indicates that it will delete the information on
request.
We identified 41.7% mismatches between users’ perceptions
and apps’ privacy policies in terms of information deletion. We
Category Sub-Category MATCH MISMATCH
YY NN % YN NY %
Financial
Primary 0 0 0.0% 6 0 100.0%
Secondary 7 1 53.3% 3 4 46.7%
SUBTOTAL 7 1 38.1% 9 4 61.9%
Identity/Personal
Communication 4 0 80.0% 0 1 20.0%
Fitness 2 0 50.0% 1 1 50.0%
Q&A 5 0 83.3% 0 1 16.7%
Social Networking 10 1 68.8% 3 2 31.3%
SUBTOTAL 21 1 71.0% 4 5 29.0%
Content
Entertainment 16 0 69.6% 0 7 30.4%
Listing 4 4 53.3% 7 0 46.7%
News 2 0 66.7% 1 0 33.3%
SUBTOTAL 22 4 63.4% 8 7 36.6%
Other
Game 8 0 72.7% 1 2 27.3%
Utility 6 0 66.7% 1 2 33.3%
SUBTOTAL 14 0 70.0% 2 4 30.0%
TOTAL 64 6 68.0% 23 20 41.7%
TABLE VIII: Deletion Preference Offered by Facebook Apps:
Users’ Perceptions Compared to Privacy Policy
found the most mismatches for the financial apps (61.9%),
followed by the apps in other (41.7%), content (36.6%),
and identity categories (29.0%). Overall, we found 53.5%
‘YN’ mismatch, with 100% ‘YN’ mismatches for the apps
in ‘financial: primary’ category (see Table VIII).
We found a 40.4% mismatch rate for male participants
and 35.7% mismatch rate for female participants, where our
analysis reveals 52.2% and 55% ‘YN’ mismatch for the male
and female participants, respectively. However, these analysis
are not significant.
We conducted significance tests to identify if the mis-
matched privacy perceptions of users in terms of information
collection and deletion vary across application categories or
type of information. We did not find any significant differences
in these cases.
F. Expectations: Never Collect or Share
In this section, we present our findings on the expectations
of users about the types of information that should not be
collected or shared by any app, where we compare those
expectations between the users from two different groups:
students (mean age: 23) and university staff (mean age: 40).
1) Collection.: Figure 1a presents the information that
participants expect not to be collected by any app, where
students are found to be more lenient than the professional
staff members. Most students (85%) do not expect inbox
messages to be collected by an app, and half of the student
participants believe that no app should collect their photos and
videos, information about their family and relationships, places
they have lived, and their Facebook friends. The majority of
participants from the staff pool do not expect any information
except the contact and basic information of users should be
collected by an app. In this regard, 91% of the staff participants
do not expect inbox message to be collected by any app,
and about three-fourths of the participants from the staff pool
believe that no app should collect their photos and videos or
information about their Facebook friends.
2) Sharing.: Figure 1b presents the information that partic-
ipants expect not to be shared by an app with other entities.
Around three-fourths of student participants expect that their
inbox messages and photos and videos would not be shared
with other entities. The professional staff members reported a
more strict expectation in terms of information sharing; more
than 80% of them believe that none of the information should
be shared by an app with other entities, except for contact
and basic information, where still two-thirds of staff members
expect the information to not be shared.
3) Collection vs. Sharing.: Overall, the participants in both
groups (students and staff) expect that apps will collect more
information than they share with other entities. Among stu-
dents, for example, 84% expect that apps will collect contact
and basic information and the information about their work
and education, but just 60% expect that this information might
be shared. Similarly, 64% of staff members do not think their
contact and basic information should be shared by any app,
in contrast to 9% of staff who do not expect this information
to be collected by any app. Also, 40% of students and 55%
of staff expect the information about their current location not
to be collected by any app, while 65% of students and 81%
of staff do not expect their current location to be shared with
other entities by any app.
V. DISCUSSION
We now discuss the implications of our findings, the limita-
tions of our work, and possible directions for future research.
A. Information Sharing through Facebook
Participants are more conservative in sharing their contact
information (e.g., mobile number, email ID) and physical
address through their Facebook profile as compared with
their personal information, like name, gender, relationship
status, and political and religious views. Users may prioritize
the information to make their sharing decision based on
its immediate effect on possible privacy risks, where prior
study identified users’ tendency to care less about “distant”
harms [11]. A majority of participants do not share their
current location publicly in Facebook, which could be related
to their privacy concerns [32], and declining popularity of
location-sharing in social networking sites [42].
Users often create passwords based on their personal in-
formation [57, 58]. Personal information are also used to
answer security questions, a widely-used method for fallback
authentication [19, 29]. Our study reveals that at least one-
third of participants publicly share their information about
educational institutions, workplace, and current city; which
could pose security risks to their online accounts, further
elevated due to password reuse [20, 51], if those information
are used for password creation.
Participants seem to weigh the sensitivity of information
based on its level of details, and make their sharing decision
accordingly, like many of them share their current city as
a public information in Facebook profile, but do not share
current physical address even with friends in Facebook. It is
not clear though how the users set thresholds between varying
level of details in personal information while making a sharing
decision over online social network. Future investigations
should shed light into this issue, and identify the privacy
implications of users’ mental model of information sharing
with varying level of details in social networking sites.
B. Security and Privacy Practices in Facebook
Around one-sixth of our participants were victim of online
scam incurring monetary loss, where one-third of participants
reported leakage of their personal information to unwanted en-
tities through social networking site and online activities. So-
cial engineering attacks including phishing and online scams
are on rise in recent years, especially through exploiting users’
insecure online behavior including in Facebook [3, 18, 27, 33].
Our results support this argument, where the majority of
participants do not check for a secure connection (e.g., https,












































































































(b) Should Not Be Shared
Fig. 1: User Expectations: Information that Should Not Be (a) Collected or (b) Shared by Any Facebook App
over a link (to be assured of the destination site) before
clicking on it in their Facebook newsfeed.
We found interesting differences between student and staff
population in what triggers them to check the security and
privacy setting of their Facebook account. Our results suggest
that students are more enthusiastic than staff population to
learn about the latest changes in the security and privacy
setting of Facebook when they receive an online notification
of such changes. On the other hand, staffs are more likely
than the students to check their security and privacy setting
in Facebook when they come to know about a security or
privacy breach at someone else’s account. These findings have
important implications on considering the demographic traits
of users to design effective security and privacy notifications.
For example, including a link to the relevant news of privacy
breach with the notification could better motivate staff popula-
tion to review the latest changes in Facebook’s privacy setting.
In other words, informing users about the vulnerabilities that
motivated a change in the security or privacy setting could
intrigue them to take full advantage of those new features in
Facebook.
The majority of participants add unknown people to their
friend list without verifying their identity. However, most of
the participants do not review their friend list to identify
fake or suspicious entity when their Facebook account is
compromised, or they hear of similar incidents from friends
or family members. It is not clear though if it is due to users’
trust on their Facebook friends, or their ignorance in reviewing
friend list to identify suspicious entity. In this regard, the rate
of adding unknown friend is higher among student population
as compared to staff members, where staff population reported
higher confidence than the students that they do not have any
fake people in their Facebook friend list.
Privacy is one of the noted concerns of the participants about
the apps connected to their Facebook account. However, they
did not remove any app yet due to privacy concern. So, it is
possible that despite being worried about the data collection
by their Facebook apps, they do not see it as an immediate
threat to their online privacy. Or, users might perceive that if
they stop using an app it also puts an end to the data collection,
and further removal of that app is not needed to preserve their
digital privacy. We could not conclude which of the above
statements holds true for the participants, since we did not
explicitly ask them about it. A further investigation in future
research would give us clear insights into this issue.
C. Facebook Apps: Perceptions, Expectations, and Privacy
Policy
In more than one-third of cases, participants’ perceptions
of information collection do not match with reality (i.e., apps’
privacy policy). A closer look into those mismatches reveals
that in most cases participants perceive that the information
is not collected by an app, although that information is
actually collected according to the app’s privacy policy. For the
mismatched perceptions of information deletion, participants
mistakenly perceive in majority of cases that they would be
allowed to delete their information collected by the apps. As
it appears, users have lack in understanding about the infor-
mation collection and deletion policy of the apps connected to
their Facebook account. In other words, they use these apps
without fully realizing their privacy compromise.
The mismatched privacy perceptions of users implies that
the privacy notice of Facebook apps need to attain higher
efficacy and usability in informing them about the information
collection, sharing, and deletion policy. Prior studies [9, 17,
31, 34, 53]proposed several techniques, including the use of
icons, nutrition label, and comics to enhance the effectiveness
and usability of privacy notices. On top of these techniques,
our results suggest to highlight the aspects in privacy pol-
icy where we found a relatively higher mismatch between
users’ perceptions and apps’ privacy policy. We also identified
differences in mismatched privacy perceptions across gender,
where female participants had a significantly higher ‘NY’
mismatch in terms of information collection, indicating the
importance of designing personalized privacy notice by taking
users’ demographic traits into account.
The completeness in privacy policy is crucial to help users
with making informed decision. Both the student and staff
population reported strict expectations in terms of informa-
tion sharing with other entities by the apps. They are more
conservative in their expectations for information sharing, in
comparison to information collection by the apps. Using those
apps first-hand may make them comfortable with information
collection, while they are concerned when their information
is shared with unknown entities by the apps. So, the apps
should clearly state their policy of information sharing in their
privacy notice. However, our analysis of the privacy policy of
65 apps (reported by the participants) reveal that those apps
fail to provide sufficient details or ignore mentioning about
information sharing. Thus, users do not have a clear way
to learn how their information is shared with other entities,
despite their expectations that their information would not be
shared by the Facebook apps.
D. Limitations and Future Work
Although our sample size is relatively small, we collected
data on a total of 113 apps, including 65 unique apps across
multiple categories, e.g., financial, identity, content. This study
is based in an urban university, where most of the participants
are educated. We note that users’ privacy perceptions might be
different in areas with a less-educated population. Since users’
security and privacy perceptions are positively influenced
by their knowledge and technical efficacy [23, 40, 49], we
speculate that the privacy perceptions of users reported in this
paper represent an upper bound. That means, the mismatches
between users’ privacy perceptions and the privacy policy of
apps might be higher for the less-educated population than the
results reported in this paper. Thus, the findings from this study
might not be generalizable to the entire population, and might
not directly contribute to the development of privacy theory.
Rather, the implications of this study are more focused towards
the design of usable and effective privacy notices through
understanding users’ privacy perceptions and expectations.
We conducted the study in a lab setting, which offers a
controlled environment with minimal distraction for partic-
ipants [5, 15]. Like prior lab-based studies conducted in a
university environment (e.g., [1, 2, 22]), we recruited partici-
pants from the university’s student and employee populations,
where our participants have diverse demographic characteris-
tics (see §IV-A for details).
Now that our results provide interesting insights into the
mismatch between reality (i.e., app’s privacy policy) and
users’ privacy perceptions of Facebook apps, in future work,
we would conduct a large-scale online study using Amazon
Mechanical Turk to get participants from diverse backgrounds.
In this study, if a participant had more than five apps
connected to their Facebook account, we asked them to report
five apps that they use most frequently. Facebook does not
provide a feature to sort the apps based on a user’s frequency
of use or any metric. So, the participants had to rely on their
memorability and self-judgment to select most frequently-
used apps, where we could not verify if the reported apps
are used most frequently by the participants. In addition, we
had to omit a few apps from analysis due to spelling errors
making the app names unrecognizable. Despite these issues,
we compared users’ perceptions with the privacy policy of 65
different Facebook apps.
In this paper, keeping consistent with the methodology
suggested in prior work [43], we consider the privacy policy
of a website or app to be representative of its data collection
practices. Going further to identify the discrepancies between
an app’s privacy policy and its actual data collection practices
is thus beyond the scope of this work. Future research to
investigate such discrepancies would be valuable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The widespread use of social login to access third-party apps
via a user’s Facebook profile creates significant risks to user
privacy. In this work, we studied Facebook users’ information
sharing practices and the security and privacy practices they
use to protect their information. The varying privacy policies
of Facebook apps could make it difficult for users to have a
clear understanding about how individual apps are collecting
and sharing data, as well as whether they enable users to
delete any collected data. In this regard, we compared users’
perceptions with the privacy policies of 65 different Facebook
apps that are frequently used by our participants. Our analysis
reveals the gaps between users’ perceptions and these privacy
policies, providing important directions for future research: (i)
to gain a more in-depth understanding on this issue through a
large-scale study with diverse groups of populations, and (ii)
helping users to make informed decisions by designing usable
and effective privacy notice and choice.
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Do Not Share Friends Public
Full Name 3 6 22
Current Workplace 6 13 12
Previous Workplaces 7 14 10
College 3 13 15
High School 5 14 12
Professional Skills 14 11 6
Current City 6 14 11
Hometown 7 15 9
Other Places You’ve Lived 12 14 5
Mobile Number 25 6 0
Email Address 21 9 1
Other Phone Number 27 4 0
Current Physical Address 27 4 0
Public Key 28 3 0
Personal Website 20 8 3
Other SNS 19 11 1
Birthday 8 19 4
Birthyear 12 15 4
Gender 4 13 14
Languages 16 9 6
Religious Views 17 9 5
Political Views 17 10 4
Who You’re Interested In 18 9 4
Current Relationship Status 13 14 4
Spouse 12 17 2
Parents 9 20 2
Siblings 8 19 4
Others 11 16 4
About You 10 15 6
Name Pronunciation 17 8 6
Other Names 18 7 6
Favorite Quotes 15 12 4
TABLE IX: Users’ Information Sharing Settings
Security and Privacy Scenario Student Staff
Creating a secure password for my Facebook account 5.9 5.5
Having no fake people in my friend list 5.4 6.4
Taking necessary precautions to protect my
Facebook account from being compromised/hacked 5.6 5.4
Understanding the latest security and privacy
settings/features in Facebook 5.2 4.3
Protecting my personal information in Facebook
from unauthorized access by third-party applications 5.6 5.1
Not clicking on malicious posts, links, or videos 6.4 5.8
Sharing information about others in Facebook
that will NOT harm their privacy 6.1 6.0
Protecting my device from malware
(e.g. a computer virus) spreading through Facebook 6.4 4.7
Taking necessary actions to regain my
account if it is compromised/hacked 5.7 5.1
Protecting my personal information, photos, or videos
in Facebook from the people whom I don’t want to share them with 6.2 5.4
TABLE X: Users’ Self-Efficacy in Maintaining the Security
and Privacy of their Facebook Account (7-Point Likert Scale)
Work & Education Places I Have Lived Contact & Basic Info
MATCH MISMATCH MATCH MISMATCH MATCH MISMATCH
Main Category Subcategory Total YY NN % YN NY % YY NN % YN NY % YY NN % YN NY %
Finance Primary 6 0 3 50.0% 3 0 50.0% 1 5 100.0% 0 0 0.0% 4 0 66.7% 0 2 33.3%
Secondary 15 0 10 66.7% 5 0 33.3% 5 1 40.0% 1 8 60.0% 10 0 66.7% 0 5 33.3%
SUBTOTAL 21 0 13 61.9% 8 0 38.1% 6 6 57.1% 1 8 42.9% 14 0 66.7% 0 7 33.3%
Identity/Personal Communication 5 0 5 100.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 5 100.0% 5 0 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
Fitness 4 0 2 50.0% 0 2 50.0% 1 0 25.0% 1 2 75.0% 4 0 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
Q&A 6 0 1 16.7% 5 0 83.3% 0 3 50.0% 3 0 50.0% 5 0 83.3% 0 1 16.7%
Social Networking 16 1 11 75.0% 4 0 25.0% 6 7 81.3% 1 2 18.8% 14 0 87.5% 0 2 12.5%
SUBTOTAL 31 1 19 64.5% 9 2 35.5% 7 10 54.8% 5 9 45.2% 28 0 90.3% 0 3 9.7%
Content Entertainment 23 0 18 78.3% 2 3 21.7% 4 0 17.4% 0 19 82.6% 10 0 43.5% 0 13 56.5%
Listing 15 0 10 66.7% 4 1 33.3% 4 0 26.7% 0 11 73.3% 14 0 93.3% 0 1 6.7%
News 3 0 0 0.0% 3 0 100.0% 2 0 66.7% 1 0 33.3% 3 0 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
SUBTOTAL 41 0 28 68.3% 9 4 31.7% 10 0 24.4% 1 30 75.6% 27 0 65.9% 0 14 34.1%
Other Game 11 0 9 81.8% 2 0 18.2% 0 6 54.5% 0 5 45.5% 9 0 81.8% 0 2 18.2%
Utility 9 1 6 77.8% 1 1 22.2% 1 1 22.2% 0 7 77.8% 7 0 77.8% 0 2 22.2%
SUBTOTAL 20 1 15 80.0% 3 1 20.0% 1 7 40.0% 0 12 60.0% 16 0 80.0% 0 4 20.0%
TOTAL 113 2 75 68.1% 29 7 31.9% 24 23 41.6% 7 59 58.4% 85 0 75.2% 0 28 24.8%
TABLE XI: Information Collected by Facebook Apps: Users’
Perceptions Compared to Privacy Policy - Part 1
Family & Relationship Details about Me Photos & Vids
MATCH MISMATCH MATCH MISMATCH MATCH MISMATCH
Main Category Subcategory Total YY NN % YN NY % YY NN % YN NY % YY NN % YN NY %
Finance
Primary 6 1 1 33.3% 0 4 66.7% 3 0 50.0% 0 3 50.0% 0 6 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
Secondary 15 0 13 86.7% 1 1 13.3% 6 1 46.7% 5 3 53.3% 0 14 93.3% 1 0 6.7%
SUBTOTAL 21 1 14 71.4% 1 5 28.6% 9 1 47.6% 5 6 52.4% 0 20 95.2% 1 0 4.8%
Identity/Personal
Communication 5 0 0 0.0% 0 5 100.0% 2 0 40.0% 0 3 60.0% 2 0 40.0% 0 3 60.0%
Fitness 4 0 2 50.0% 2 0 50.0% 1 0 25.0% 2 1 75.0% 0 4 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
Q&A 6 0 0 0.0% 0 6 100.0% 3 0 50.0% 0 3 50.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 6 100.0%
Social Networking 16 4 4 50.0% 0 8 50.0% 13 0 81.3% 1 2 18.8% 10 2 75.0% 1 3 25.0%
SUBTOTAL 31 4 6 32.3% 2 19 67.7% 19 0 61.3% 3 9 38.7% 12 6 58.1% 1 12 41.9%
Content
Entertainment 23 2 8 43.5% 1 12 56.5% 13 2 65.2% 2 6 34.8% 0 19 82.6% 1 3 17.4%
Listing 15 1 4 33.3% 0 10 66.7% 11 2 86.7% 1 1 13.3% 0 12 80.0% 2 1 20.0%
News 3 0 2 66.7% 1 0 33.3% 1 0 33.3% 2 0 66.7% 0 3 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
SUBTOTAL 41 3 14 41.5% 2 22 58.5% 25 4 70.7% 5 7 29.3% 0 34 82.9% 3 4 17.1%
Other
Game 11 0 9 81.8% 1 1 18.2% 3 5 72.7% 1 2 27.3% 0 8 72.7% 3 0 27.3%
Utility 9 1 4 55.6% 1 3 44.4% 3 4 77.8% 2 0 22.2% 0 7 77.8% 2 0 22.2%
SUBTOTAL 20 1 13 70.0% 2 4 30.0% 6 9 75.0% 3 2 25.0% 0 15 75.0% 5 0 25.0%
TOTAL 113 9 47 49.6% 7 50 50.4% 59 14 64.6% 16 24 35.4% 12 75 77.0% 10 16 23.0%
TABLE XII: Information Collected by Facebook Apps: Users’
Perceptions Compared to Privacy Policy - Part 2
Current Location Friends’ Info Posts on Newsfeed
MATCH MISMATCH MATCH MISMATCH MATCH MISMATCH
Main Category Subcategory Total YY NN % YN NY % YY NN % YN NY % YY NN % YN NY %
Finance
Primary 6 0 4 66.7% 1 1 33.3% 4 1 83.3% 0 1 16.7% 0 6 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
Secondary 15 5 0 33.3% 1 9 66.7% 0 9 60.0% 0 6 40.0% 0 14 93.3% 1 0 6.7%
SUBTOTAL 21 5 4 42.9% 2 10 57.1% 4 10 66.7% 0 7 33.3% 0 20 95.2% 1 0 4.8%
Identity/Personal
Communication 5 0 0 0.0% 0 5 100.0% 1 0 20.0% 0 4 80.0% 0 5 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
Fitness 4 0 2 50.0% 0 2 50.0% 1 2 75.0% 0 1 25.0% 0 4 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
Q&A 6 0 5 83.3% 1 0 16.7% 0 5 83.3% 1 0 16.7% 0 4 66.7% 2 0 33.3%
Social Networking 16 7 2 56.3% 0 7 43.8% 3 3 37.5% 1 9 62.5% 1 13 87.5% 2 0 12.5%
SUBTOTAL 31 7 9 51.6% 1 14 48.4% 5 10 48.4% 2 14 51.6% 1 26 87.1% 4 0 12.9%
Content
Entertainment 23 3 11 60.9% 1 8 39.1% 8 3 47.8% 1 11 52.2% 0 17 73.9% 3 3 26.1%
Listing 15 7 2 60.0% 0 6 40.0% 1 3 26.7% 0 11 73.3% 0 12 80.0% 2 1 20.0%
News 3 1 1 66.7% 1 0 33.3% 0 3 100.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 3 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
SUBTOTAL 41 11 14 61.0% 2 14 39.0% 9 9 43.9% 1 22 56.1% 0 32 78.0% 5 4 22.0%
Other
Game 11 1 6 63.6% 1 3 36.4% 2 0 18.2% 1 8 81.8% 0 9 81.8% 2 0 18.2%
Utility 9 5 1 66.7% 1 2 33.3% 0 6 66.7% 2 1 33.3% 0 7 77.8% 2 0 22.2%
SUBTOTAL 20 6 7 65.0% 2 5 35.0% 2 6 40.0% 3 9 60.0% 0 16 80.0% 4 0 20.0%
TOTAL 113 29 34 55.8% 7 43 44.2% 20 35 48.7% 6 52 51.3% 1 94 84.1% 14 4 15.9%
TABLE XIII: Information Collected by Facebook Apps:
Users’ Perceptions Compared to Privacy Policy - Part 3
Online Presence Inbox Other
MATCH MISMATCH MATCH MISMATCH MATCH MISMATCH
Main Category Subcategory Total YY NN % YN NY % YY NN % YN NY % YY NN % YN NY %
Finance
Primary 6 1 0 16.7% 0 5 83.3% 0 6 100.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 6 100.0%
Secondary 15 5 0 33.3% 0 10 66.7% 0 15 100.0% 0 0 0.0% 1 0 6.7% 0 14 93.3%
SUBTOTAL 21 6 0 28.6% 0 15 71.4% 0 21 100.0% 0 0 0.0% 1 0 4.8% 0 20 95.2%
Identity/Personal
Communication 5 0 0 0.0% 0 5 100.0% 0 4 80.0% 1 0 20.0% 0 5 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
Fitness 4 0 1 25.0% 0 3 75.0% 0 4 100.0% 0 0 0.0% 1 0 25.0% 0 3 75.0%
Q&A 6 4 0 66.7% 0 2 33.3% 0 4 66.7% 2 0 33.3% 0 6 100.0% 0 0 0.0%
Social Networking 16 2 3 31.3% 0 11 68.8% 0 15 93.8% 1 0 6.3% 0 4 25.0% 0 12 75.0%
SUBTOTAL 31 6 4 32.3% 0 21 67.7% 0 27 87.1% 4 0 12.9% 1 15 51.6% 0 15 48.4%
Content
Entertainment 23 5 7 52.2% 3 8 47.8% 0 22 95.7% 1 0 4.3% 2 7 39.1% 3 11 60.9%
Listing 15 5 0 33.3% 0 10 66.7% 0 14 93.3% 1 0 6.7% 1 5 40.0% 0 9 60.0%
News 3 1 0 33.3% 0 2 66.7% 0 3 100.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 3 100.0%
SUBTOTAL 41 11 7 43.9% 3 20 56.1% 0 39 95.1% 2 0 4.9% 3 12 36.6% 3 23 63.4%
Other
Game 11 5 0 45.5% 0 6 54.5% 0 11 100.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 11 100.0%
Utility 9 0 5 55.6% 1 3 44.4% 0 9 100.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 3 33.3% 1 5 66.7%
SUBTOTAL 20 5 5 50.0% 1 9 50.0% 0 20 100.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 3 15.0% 1 16 85.0%
TOTAL 113 28 16 38.9% 4 65 61.1% 0 107 94.7% 6 0 5.3% 5 30 31.0% 4 74 69.0%
TABLE XIV: Information Collected by Facebook Apps:
Users’ Perceptions Compared to Privacy Policy - Part 4
